基于双层决策的装备订购多因素激励定价模型与算法

doi:10.3969/j.issn.1001-506X.2020.06.18

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

装备订购价格是军方与承制单位双方利益争执的焦点,为全面调动承制单位生产积极性,选择成本、质量和进度同时作为激励因素,在将三因素整合到同一函数表达式的基础上,统筹考虑订购双方利益,构建了装备订购多因素激励定价双层决策模型。分别以军方的激励系数方案和承制单位的努力程度方案为模型的上下层决策变量,并以军方军事经济效益和承制单位期望效用最大化为上下层决策目标。为求解模型得到相对最优激励系数方案,结合粒子群优化算法的快速搜索能力与禁忌算法的全局搜索能力,设计了带检验因子的禁忌搜索粒子群优化(tabu search-particle swarm optimization, TS-PSD)算法。最后,通过算例验证了该模型与算法的有效性,可以引导承制单位向军方期望的目标努力,实现共赢。

关键词: 装备订购, 激励定价, 成本-质量-进度, 双层决策模型, 混合粒子群优化算法

Abstract:

Military equipment ordering price is the focus of interest dispute between the military and the contractors. In order to motivate the contractors to produce, taking cost, quality and progress as incentive factors, and considering the interests of both parties, based on integrating the three factors into the same function, the bi-level decision-making model of the multi-factor incentive pricing is built. The upper model takes the incentive coefficients as the decision-making variables and maximize the military economic benefits of the military as the objective, the lower model takes the efforts'degree as the decision-making variables and maximize the expected utility of the contractors as the objective. To solve the model and obtain the relatively optimal incentive coefficients, by integrating the fast search capability of particle swarm optimization algorithm with the global search ability of tabu search, the tabu search-particle swarm optimization (TS-PSD) algorithm with test factor is designed. Finally, a case is studied to demonstrate the rationality of the method and algorithm, which can effectively guide the contractors to strive for the goal expected by the military and achieve win-win.

Key words: military equipment ordering, incentive pricing, cost-quality-progress, bi-level decision-making model, hybrid particle swarm optimization algorithm

中图分类号:

孙胜祥, 韩霜. 基于双层决策的装备订购多因素激励定价模型与算法[J]. 系统工程与电子技术, 2020, 42(6): 1338-1347.

Shengxiang SUN, Shuang HAN. Multi-factor incentive pricing model and algorithm for military equipment ordering based on bi-level decision-making[J]. Systems Engineering and Electronics, 2020, 42(6): 1338-1347.

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目标值		F(x, y)	f(x, y)
文献[28-29]算法		158.230 8	61.987 6
TS-PSO 算法	最优值	158.514 8	62.421 3
	最差值	158.486 3	62.359 1
	平均值	158.501 3	62.391 6
	标准方差	0.009 7	0.016 8

努力程度方案			定价成本/ (百万元)	定价质量	定价进度/ (月数)	订购价格/ (百万元)	军事经济效益	净利润/ (百万元)	确定性等价
成本	质量	进度	定价成本/ (百万元)	定价质量	定价进度/ (月数)	订购价格/ (百万元)	军事经济效益	净利润/ (百万元)	确定性等价
6.90	0.108	0.80	933.04	0.95	53.20	1 014.99	158.51	81.95	68.42
6.80	0.107	0.78	932.05	0.95	53.22	1 013.78	158.45	81.73	68.33
4.30	0.111	0.79	937.05	0.95	53.21	1 017.37	158.38	80.33	68.16
9.30	0.110	0.22	921.42	0.95	53.78	999.30	157.99	77.89	66.65
0.00	0.108	0.80	939.94	0.95	53.20	1 017.13	156.36	77.19	65.86
6.50	0.122	1.20	954.95	0.96	52.80	1 037.12	155.03	82.17	62.56
2.50	0.091	0.55	922.77	0.93	53.45	998.46	154.31	75.69	66.74
4.70	0.082	0.43	914.23	0.92	53.57	989.02	151.85	74.79	66.01
10.30	0.078	0.23	904.41	0.92	53.77	979.67	149.52	75.26	63.31
5.30	0.073	0.56	911.90	0.91	53.44	987.11	148.75	75.21	65.23
5.80	0.055	0.61	905.33	0.90	53.39	977.99	139.71	72.65	62.08
5.40	0.065	1.12	924.40	0.91	52.88	999.88	139.44	75.48	58.45
7.50	0.043	0.67	900.89	0.88	53.33	972.48	131.86	71.59	59.37
23.00	0.044	0.10	877.84	0.88	53.90	953.02	130.03	75.19	42.62
6.90	0.108	0.00	921.60	0.95	54.00	993.52	128.91	71.93	63.01
3.30	0.032	0.45	897.57	0.87	53.55	961.51	121.31	63.95	55.88
1.20	0.034	0.12	896.72	0.87	53.88	954.77	116.04	58.05	51.86
6.90	0.000	0.80	894.54	0.84	53.20	953.83	40.23	59.29	46.16
0.00	0.000	0.00	890.00	0.84	54.00	934.50	8.50	44.50	38.55